carolina flores

Carolina Flores

I am a philosopher and assistant professor at the University of Lisbon. I received my Ph.D. from Rutgers and my BA from Oxford. I go by both "Caro" and "Carolina" and I use pronouns she/they.

I primarily write about ignorance and resistance to evidence: their nature, social and psychological basis, and epistemology, as well as their connections with social identity, oppressive social structures, and technology. I also write non-academic essays on related topics.

  
  

research

articles

I've starred (✰) my personal favorites. All are (also) available on PhilPapers.

in press

Why think that belief is evidence-responsive? In Eric Schwitzgebel and Jonathan Jong (eds.), The Nature of Belief. Oxford University Press.

  • I argue that belief is constitutively responsive to evidence based on the function of the concept of belief, and offer additional theoretical and ethical benefits of this view.

2025

✰ Calling trauma, elite capture, and hermeneutical injustice. The Philosophical Quarterly, 75(4):1294–1320.

  • I explore how appeals to trauma can perpetuate ignorance and inflict hermeneutical injustice by looking at the aftermath of Portuguese colonialism. I then draw on this case study to show that hermeneutical injustice does not essentially involve hermeneutical gaps or even bad hermeneutical resources.

✰ Resistant beliefs, responsive believers. The Journal of Philosophy, 122(4):133–159.

  • Many have thought that empirical findings about evidence-resistance show that belief cannot be constitutively evidence-responsive. I argue that this is wrong. Empirical findings on human irrationality paradoxically support the view that belief is evidence-responsive.

Identity-protective reasoning: An epistemic and political defense. Episteme, 22(3):707-730.

  • I argue that resisting evidence to beliefs tied to cherished identities can play positive epistemic roles: collectively, it can facilitate an effective division of cognitive labor, and individually, in epistemically hostile environments, it can counter ideological ignorance.

Delusions and epistemic style: A neurodiversity approach to reasoning in schizophrenia. Synthese, 205, 173.

  • I explore how delusion-supporting reasoning in schizophrenia can be rendered intelligible by showing that distinctive cognitive biases involved coalesce into a unified epistemic style, one which is understandable in light of anomalous experiences and social exclusion.

2024

✰ Playing with labels: Identity terms as tools for building agency (with Elisabeth Camp). The Philosophical Quarterly, 74(4): 1103–1136.

  • We develop an account of how identity labels function and draw on it to explore how, when used playfully, they can be resources for agency, solidarity, and self-construction, instead of restrictive shackles for complex selves.

2023

Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering (with Elise Woodard). Philosophical Studies, 180(9): 2547–2571.

  • We argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering by (1) undermining the significance of evidence being "in the head" and (2) considering ordinary social practices of epistemic accountability. We explore implications for epistemic normativity and inquiry. Here is a tongue-in-cheek summary.

2021

Epistemic styles, Philosophical Topics, 49(2):35–55. (Translated into Portuguese in this volume).

  • Why do different people interact with the same evidence in different ways? I argue that, in some cases, it is not because of differences in beliefs but to differences in epistemic style. I develop an account of what these are and explore implications. Here is a short general-audience explainer.

Delusional evidence-responsiveness, Synthese 199 (3-4):6299–6330.

  • I argue that delusions are evidence-responsive. Their relationship to evidence is no obstacle to them counting as beliefs.

shorter pieces

2024

Review of Mona Simion’s Resistance to Evidence, Mind.

  • I review Simion's book and explore the relationship between her view of belief and my own, as well as the prospects for grounding epistemic normativity in the social.

Delusion and evidence, in Ema Sullivan-Bissett (ed.), Routledge Handbook on the Philosophy of Delusion. Routledge, pp. 189–201.

  • I survey work on the relationship between clinical delusions and evidence. Once we carefully consider different conceptions of evidence and what evidence people with delusions have, delusions appear less irrational and more continuous with ordinary beliefs.

2023

Epistemic style in OCD, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 30(2): 147-150.

  

non-academic writing

I’ve written for Jacobin (The left can't abandon nostalgia to the right), Liberal Currents (When words are stolen, with Nico Orlandi), Big Think (Groupthink is for mindless pawns, but group thinking will push humanity further), and Tech Policy Press (Grokipedia won't destroy knowledge, but it might divide us more). Earlier, I also wrote for the Philosophers' Magazine (Keeping better company), 1,000-Word Philosophy (Critical thinking: What is it to be a critical thinker?), and the Blog of the APA (Are they all stupid and irrational?).

In Portuguese, I've written for Shifter (Corpos espumosos e o confronto com a vunerabilidade) and Público (A Igreja de Francisco não é para “todos, todos, todos”, por muito que o repitam). See my CV for a full list of public-facing writing.

  

editorial work and conferences

I edit the APA Studies on LGBTQ Philosophy. Check out the 2025 edition, "Make philosophy queer again!", for delectable essays on queering philosophy, as well as The Queer Agenda, a rubric with reading suggestions and open questions. For 2026, I am seeking submissions on resistance and solidarity (pitches due Jan 30, 2026). This work followed upon my organizing the Queer Analytic Philosophy Conference at UC Santa Cruz (with Nico Orlandi and Lauren Lyons) in 2025 - the first conference of its kind!

I am also currently guest editor (with Gloria Andrada) of a special issue of Hypatia on feminist philosophy of mind. Submissions are due in February 2026. This followed our workshop on the topic at NOVA University in Lisbon in 2023. Check out our post for the Blog of the APA about the project.

In 2019-20, I was Director of MAP (Minorities and Philosophy). In 2018, I co-organized a large MAP conference on oppression and resistance.

  

teaching

I have taught introduction to philosophy (semester and quarter versions), applied epistemology, feminist philosophy (semester and quarter versions), critical thinking, and philosophy of cognitive science. I have also taught advanced seminars on bias, the attention crisis, and misinformation and propaganda. Syllabi are linked.

I have also designed materials on skills in philosophy: reading philosophy, coming up with questions for papers, selecting a bibliography, thinking of objections, outlining, writing a paper, and networking and presenting at conferences, as well as materials for in-class outline and draft workshops (following Thi Nguyen's workshop sequence). Feel free to use or adapt any of these!

  

cv

You can download my CV here.

  

contact

You can email me at florescaro at pm.me. You can find me on Mastodon and Bluesky as @floresophize.